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New European Security Strategy – 
The Transatlantic Factor 
Annegret Bendiek and Markus Kaim 
A wave of new foreign policy and security challenges have made certain aspects of 
earlier European Union strategic thinking obsolete. In response, Federica Mogherini, 
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
has announced her intention to prepare a new European Security Strategy (ESS). The 
process is to proceed in two stages. First, an analysis of the current strategic coordi-
nates within which the EU’s foreign and security policy must operate will be presented 
to the summit of heads of state and government in Brussels in June 2015. The second 
stage will comprise an inclusive, pan-European debate on the EU’s external and security 
roles. The results of that discussion will flow into a new European Security Strategy, 
whose publication is due in 2016. The question for the member states today is what 
kind of role the EU should play in the world, and in particular what its relationship to 
the United States should look like. 
 
The first European Security Strategy (ESS), 
A Secure Europe in a Better World, was adopted 
in 2003 by the then fifteen EU member 
states. It represented above all a response to 
strife within Europe in the aftermath of the 
2003 Iraq war. Javier Solana, then EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy, was tasked in summer 2003 with 
formulating an ESS. The document would 
for the first time define shared foreign poli-
cy priorities, in order to promote coherent 
collective external action. 
The geopolitical scope of this first ESS, 
which the European Council adopted on 
12 December 2003, was ambitious: The 
European Union, it stated, was “inevitably 
a global player” and therefore had to be 
“ready to share in the responsibility for 
global security and in building a better 
world”. Transnational terrorism, prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, re-
gional conflicts, failing and failed states, 
and organised crime were identified as 
the main threats to Europe’s security. The 
Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy of 2008 honed the basic 
thrust of the ESS without setting any com-
pletely new directions. But in recent years 
calls to revise or reformulate the document 
have grown increasingly insistent, on the 
grounds that the security environment has 
witnessed fundamental change since 2003 
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and a modification is long overdue. The 
governments of the now twenty-eight 
member states long recoiled at the thought 
of revision, fearing renewed division over 
strategic questions such as transatlantic 
relations. But the latest turmoil in Europe’s 
backyard has generated a head of pressure 
for strategic repositioning. In June 2015, 
after consultations with the foreign and 
defence ministers, the High Representative 
will present the report on changes in the 
security environment commissioned by the 
European Council. She expects the heads 
of state and government to grant her a 
mandate to pursue the process of reforming 
the ESS. Mogherini has already indicated a 
number of cornerstones: In the most turbu-
lent era in Europe since the end of the Cold 
War, she says, she is convinced that the 
European Union has not been not properly 
aware of its role as a “superpower”. At the 
Munich Security Conference in February 
2015 she argued similarly ambitiously that 
the transition from global chaos to a new, 
peaceful world order was the Union’s up-
permost external objective. In April 2015 
Nathalie Tocci, Special Advisor to the High 
Representative on the ESS, distilled the 
analysis down to three aspects: the world is 
“more connected, more contested and more 
complex”. This, she said, should lead the 
Union to reflect more closely on six com-
ponents of its external action: a) stronger 
engagement in the Balkans and towards 
Turkey; b) preserving and developing the 
European post-war order; c) crises in North 
Africa and the Middle East; d) relations with 
Africa; e) the transatlantic partnership and 
EU-Nato relations; and f) improving coopera-
tion with Asia and an associated renewal 
of the system of multilateral institutions. 
A sequence of three steps is required. 
Firstly, the new security environment must 
be analysed. Secondly, a regional prioriti-
sation of EU external relations will be un-
avoidable. And thirdly, transatlantic secu-
rity relations will have to be redefined in 
parts. 
The New Quality of 
Security Challenge 
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so 
secure nor so free.” To many observers, this 
introductory sentence of the 2003 ESS re-
veals just how much the European Union’s 
external environment – and internal situa-
tion – have changed in the interim. Follow-
ing the shock of the attacks of 11 September 
2001 and divisions over the 2003 Iraq War, 
the priority of the first ESS was for the Euro-
pean Union to contribute its own crisis 
management to the global system of multi-
lateral institutions, exercising autonomy 
above all vis-à-vis the United States. Firstly, 
the European Union defined itself as a 
global actor in the narrower sense, on the 
grounds that its international political 
influence was based on the existence of a 
system of effective multilateral institutions 
and accepted norms and principles that 
were worth preserving. Secondly, it staked 
a multi-dimensional, global claim: “In con-
trast to the massive visible threat in the 
Cold War, none of the new threats is purely 
military; nor can any be tackled by purely 
military means. Each requires a mixture of 
instruments.” Two necessary preconditions 
for that global policing role can be read 
into these passages. Firstly, it was assumed 
that the European Union and its neigh-
bourhood had been permanently pacified 
and that this space would be shaped accord-
ing to the principles of the Charter of Paris. 
Or put another way, that Europe would be 
united, free and at peace with itself. Second-
ly, it was assumed that the integration pro-
cess would continue to deepen uninterrupt-
edly, with implicit faith in the appeal of a 
successful European model. On that basis 
the security-creating effect of the European 
Union was to be expanded across the entire 
globe. 
Not quite twelve years after adoption of 
the ESS, we can identify seven qualitative 
changes of strategic significance that should 
guide the planned revision. 
Firstly, the European Union and its 
member states find themselves confronted 
with an erosion of the Euro-Atlantic order. 
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This is reflected in a functional hollowing 
out of the multilateral institutions and in 
the weakening of agreed principles and 
universal values. Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea altered European borders by force 
for the first time in decades. The military 
conflict over (eastern) Ukraine represents 
a manifestation of Russia’s strategy of pre-
venting any expansion of European and 
transatlantic modes of cooperation and 
integration into its “sphere of influence”, 
by military means if necessary. Elsewhere, 
the advance of the “Islamic State” in Iraq, 
Syria and lately also Libya challenges the 
foundations and territorial boundaries of 
the system of states in the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
This deterioration results, secondly, in 
a simultaneity of what are in some respects 
very different crises threatening the Union’s 
interests and values at different levels. 
A particular coincidence of crises in 2014 
reveals especially clearly the contours of 
the conflicts of goals in foreign policy: To 
contain the Ukraine crisis Europe has en-
forced sweeping sanctions against Russia – 
but needs Moscow’s support in the nuclear 
talks with Tehran. Similarly, the Union has 
ostracised the Syrian regime for atrocities 
in the civil war – but winds up needing its 
assistance against the so-called Islamic 
State. 
The panorama of crises along Europe’s 
periphery has, thirdly, reframed the ques-
tion of the security role of the United States 
and the degree of European responsibility. 
After negative experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the United States under President 
Barack Obama has made an inward turn, 
now concentrating more on concerns at 
home. Its engagement is recognisably more 
selective and domestic political resistance 
to an active global policing role greater 
than at any time since 1945. At least in the 
Euro-Atlantic space the United States is 
leaving behind a geopolitical vacuum, al-
though there are initial signs of individual 
European states being willing to step in. In 
the Ukraine conflict for example, Washing-
ton left the Europeans, in the first place 
Germany (and France), to lead the negotia-
tions. Regardless of the political frame 
(NATO or European Union) there is good 
reason to believe that the Union will have 
to assume greater long-term security re-
sponsibility in its neighbourhood, albeit in 
close transatlantic consultation. 
Fourthly, the trend for foreign policy 
and security formats based on “bi- and 
minilateralism” and other “coalitions of 
the willing” has consolidated. The growing 
importance of the so-called Normandy 
format and the “Weimar triangle” reflect 
a renationalisation of European external 
policy that has been recognisable for some 
years, and is associated with constant or 
even rising pressure to attain geopolitical 
influence. Against this background, some 
of the larger European states are acting in 
close coordination with their fellow EU 
members, but outside the formal mecha-
nisms of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). 
The question of the partners and inter-
national organisations with and within 
which the European Union seeks to realise 
particular goals is, fifthly, decisive for Euro-
pean external policy. The rise of “new” 
powers like China has made such a reorien-
tation necessary over recent years, as have 
the inward turn in US foreign policy and 
Russia’s paradigm shift. The hackneyed 
formula of “strategic partnerships” has 
turned out to be largely an empty shell. So 
depending on the policy field, European 
external policy will often need to attract 
suitable willing partners. The Union will 
have to admit that its (financial) instru-
ments are too limited to play a leading 
global policing role. 
Sixthly, the basic assumption of the 2003 
ESS, that the success of the integration pro-
cess would serve as a model for others on 
a global scale, has crumbled. Alternative 
regional settings and organisations are 
gaining ground internationally. Numerous 
European states that have assumed respon-
sibility to uphold the Euro-Atlantic security 
policy are recognisably turning inwards 
under the pressures of budget constraints 
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in the aftermath of the European debt and 
financial crisis, dysfunctionalities in their 
political systems, and above all the rise of 
national political forces that regard globali-
sation and the European integration pro-
cess as threats and would rather isolate 
their countries from the world than shape 
it. All these developments also appear to 
weaken the European Union’s internal 
cohesion. 
These developments are, seventhly, all 
the more contradictory in that the structur-
al transformation of international politics 
and the associated loss of national autono-
my become ever more prominent. The scope 
and intensity of foreign policy management 
have become so complex as to overstretch 
the resources of individual states, as be-
comes obvious in global challenges such as 
creating a regime to limit climate change 
or reviving global trade talks. The same di-
agnosis also applies to security policy, for 
example in a regional perspective guaran-
teeing Euro-Atlantic security, or interna-
tionally in crisis management. Acting alone, 
even the big three EU member states are 
barely up to the diverse tasks involved in 
international crisis management. 
Setting Regional Priorities 
In the Treaty of Lisbon the European Union 
reiterated the global ambition set out in 
the ESS: “The Union’s action on the inter-
national scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which 
it seeks to advance in the wider world.” 
(Art. 21 [1] Treaty on European Union) 
It is uncontested that the European Union 
and its member states possess a stronger 
global presence than ever before, above all 
through trade ties and delegations. Nor is 
there any doubt that the European Union 
is fundamentally affected by global devel-
opments, be they climate change, uncon-
trolled migration or Islamist terrorism. 
What would appear questionable, however, 
is the conclusion the European Union has 
drawn in the past from this, namely, to 
define itself explicitly as a global actor. 
The crises and conflicts of 2014, includ-
ing the Ukraine crisis and the advance of 
the “Islamic State”, have revived the ques-
tion of the European Union’s security im-
pact and geopolitical horizons. One of the 
few positive consequences to have emerged 
from these crises is the strategic premium 
placed upon EU external action, which 
should be harnessed to drive the ESS process. 
The lack of collective military capabili-
ties and cumbersome, even inefficient po-
litical decision-making processes make it 
harder for the European Union to fulfil its 
global ambitions. The region for which 
the Union can and should bear primary 
geopolitical responsibility stretches to the 
Euro-Atlantic periphery: North Africa, the 
Middle East and the eastern neighbour-
hood. Here there are many – almost too 
many – foreign policy challenges waiting 
for the Union. At the same time, Europe’s 
prioritisation should complement Ameri-
ca’s, with the European Union active in this 
area in order to allow the United States to 
scale back its commitment and engage 
more strongly elsewhere. The initial con-
tours of the ESS reform process underline 
this accentuation, with the empirical find-
ing that for all the rhetoric, the centre of 
gravity of EU action lies in its own neigh-
bourhood. In order to fulfil its role as a 
fully-fledged global actor in the long term, 
the European Union therefore needs to 
assume geopolitical responsibilities pri-
marily in its own broader neighbourhood. 
If it is to operate effectively as a global 
force for order, the European Union re-
quires political partners with which it is 
broadly in agreement about objectives and 
instruments, first and foremost the United 
States. Experience since 2003 has shown 
that a European foreign and security policy 
can function neither in opposition to the 
United States nor in complete dependency. 
Europe not only needs a position of its own 
for dealing with its periphery, but also a 
joint position towards Washington, which 
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member states both assert towards and 
coordinate with the United States. 
In recent years the transatlantic security 
relationship has been characterised on both 
sides of the Atlantic largely by growing 
uncertainty about what the United States 
and Europe can expect from one another. 
The crises of 2014 have again underlined 
the extent to which transatlantic relations 
continue to guarantee Europe’s security 
and supply European action in the world 
with the necessary resources. Europe pos-
sesses only limited capacity to operate in-
dependently in global dimensions. The 
European Union will neither be in a posi-
tion to defuse the nuclear rivalry in the 
Middle East between Iran and Israel (and 
possibly soon also Saudi Arabia), nor will it 
succeed in stemming the collapse of Arab 
statehood with all its consequences for 
transnational terrorism and migration. In 
all these conflicts Europe needs the United 
States. And in this context any transatlantic 
alienation must be understood as a signifi-
cant threat to European interests. 
It also appears questionable whether the 
member states will muster up the necessary 
action in the foreseeable future. In the short 
term a communitisation of foreign and 
security policy is just as unrealistic an ex-
pectation as a tangible increase in national 
defence budgets. Furthermore, from a nor-
mative perspective the United States re-
mains Europe’s natural ally. Together the 
two sides form a transatlantic community 
of values and interests founded on ideas of 
democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
market economy. 
The division of labour between the two 
partners is no less important. Today the 
United States is looking more strongly to 
the Pacific, whereas Europe concentrates on 
Africa and the Middle East. Such a sharing 
of tasks should be recognised as a major 
pillar of transatlantic cooperation, and as 
an expression of specific competencies in 
US-EU and NATO-EU cooperation. 
Transatlantic Cooperation on 
Internal Security and Cybersecurity 
Close transatlantic coordination within 
NATO, as well as between the EU and the 
United States in the field of internal secu-
rity, opens up possibilities to address mili-
tary, civil and policing aspects under a 
single political roof. 
During the past twenty years the Euro-
pean Union has successively expanded the 
powers and resources it dedicates to inter-
nal security, and already possesses a strat-
egy of its own on the issue – which like the 
ESS is to be reformed during the coming 
months. As far as the ESS is concerned, the 
crux regarding both threats and responses 
will be to make the connection between 
internal and external affairs, for example 
concerning cybersecurity or IS fighters 
from EU member states. 
Given that non-military components play 
a major role in non-linear strategies, count-
ering such strategies also means working 
together with civil and international or-
ganisations. In this context the European 
Union should press for the UN to clarify 
the international legal position on hybrid 
warfare. The European Union could work 
with NATO to address the shared threat 
situation and use that experience as a model 
for cooperation with other international 
organisations. Here the member states need 
to intensify the exchange of information 
among their own intelligence services and 
with NATO, and place it on a new legitimis-
ing base. This will require a codex to regu-
late relations both among EU member 
states and with US and other allied intelli-
gence services. Access to the internet and 
the integrity, authenticity and confidential-
ity of data held there have become crucial 
questions of the twenty-first century. The 
state, critical infrastructure, the internal 
market and the transatlantic economic 
space as a whole are, as parts of an increas-
ingly networked world, heavily reliant upon 
the reliable functioning of information and 
communication technology and the inter-
net. Guarding cybersecurity is thus a central 
shared task of state, economy and society. 
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Above all it is a development and research 
task for the defence and security industries 
in the digital internal market and in the 
future Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership. 
Nor have the states of NATO and the 
European Union yet found an answer to the 
deliberate disinformation, infiltration and 
subversion of European societies. In cyber-
space there is a risk of the foundations of 
the democratic liberal order, like a free 
press and freedom of expression, being 
undermined. The Russian government not 
only runs anti-Western websites and tele-
vision stations, but even employs its own 
bloggers to manipulate apparently neutral 
online forums. The original function of 
these discursive spaces as instruments of 
liberty threatens to turn into the opposite. 
The unbridled openness of the internet 
offers freely accessible platforms not only 
for opposition forces, but also for state 
propaganda, anti-Western and anti-liber-
tarian voices, and even justifications of 
terrorism. 
Through the Freedom Online Coalition, 
twenty-six governments are seeking to pre-
vent such an instrumentalisation of the 
online sphere for anti-democratic initia-
tives. But the question for the NATO and EU 
members of the coalition is whether more 
active intervention to correct the gravest 
distortions is not in fact necessary. In de-
mocracies, public opinion is an increasing-
ly important factor constraining foreign 
and security policy. To completely neglect it 
risks playing into the hands of the enemies 
of the open society. 
Enhancing NATO and Consequences 
for the CSDP 
The expanding role of NATO in the course 
of the Ukraine crisis also affects the security 
and defence profile of the European Union, 
especially its relationship to the United 
States. This will have consequences for the 
future development of the Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
The financial scope of EU member states 
in the fields of security and defence will 
remain limited for the foreseeable future, 
if not indeed shrink. Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern 
Ukraine have sparked a renaissance of col-
lective defence under the NATO umbrella. 
Consequently, European countries that are 
also members of NATO will tend to dedicate 
their financial resources – and even more 
so their watchfulness – to the North Atlan-
tic Alliance rather than the European Union. 
Moreover, earlier discussions about the 
European Union acquiring security autono-
my vis-à-vis the United States have largely 
ebbed away. As NATO’s response to the 
Ukraine crisis demonstrates, the United 
States, “pivot to Asia” rhetoric notwith-
standing, continues to regard itself as a 
European power and is treated as such by 
the governments of many European coun-
tries. If it is true that the Ukraine crisis has 
politically reinvigorated NATO, it has also 
weakened the CSDP by the same measure. 
Given that central coordinates have 
shifted, the new ESS will need to reassess 
the relationship of European states to 
NATO. Of course the North Atlantic Alliance 
and the European Union should keep work-
ing to improve relations and expand co-
operation. But the latest meeting between 
the NATO foreign ministers and the High 
Representative in May 2015 confirmed 
again how strongly the known political 
barriers will continue to hamper substan-
tial cooperation. 
In view of these difficulties, the ESS will 
have to take a lead by showing how the EU 
member states in NATO could intensify 
security and defence cooperation with one 
another. This would not only open up an 
opportunity to better integrate those coun-
tries that are sceptical towards the CSDP 
into a European security framework. It 
would also allow new forms of cooperation, 
where a series of non-aligned states are 
seeking to work more closely with NATO in 
the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. 
The European Union, as the institutional 
frame for decisions, coordination, initiatives 
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and operative solutions, can simplify par-
ticipation of EU states in NATO activities – 
and in the process strengthen Europe’s 
hand and facilitate contributions to defence 
and crisis management that the states are 
no longer able to supply individually. The 
EU level is also better suited to achieving 
transatlantic coordinating independent 
European operations and contributions to 
other organisations such as the UN. 
Larger Contributions to 
UN Peacekeeping 
Another aspect touching on transatlantic 
security relations that the ESS should 
address is European contributions to UN 
peacekeeping in general, and in the Union’s 
broader neighbourhood in particular. Not 
only are high US expectations focused here, 
but the European Union possesses an essen-
tial geopolitical interest in their success. 
The number and scope of UN missions has 
grown steadily over recent years, while par-
ticipation by EU member states has steadily 
fallen. Today European states provide only 
6,000 soldiers on UN missions. This is not 
only less than half of the figure ten years 
ago, but also represents just 7 percent of 
the current total of 90,000. Although France, 
the Netherlands and the Nordic countries 
represent exceptions and the United King-
dom is just “rediscovering” peacekeeping 
missions, overall the dominant perspective 
in European capitals is that UN missions 
are unprofessionally run, distract from 
NATO and EU security obligations, and are 
irrelevant to the question of transatlantic 
burden-sharing. 
With two thirds of UN missions operat-
ing in active crisis regions, there is large 
and rising demand for high-grade military 
capabilities of the kind that EU states are 
particularly well-equipped to provide, for 
example reconnaissance and helicopter 
gunships. Against this background, the 
United States approves of EU states playing 
a larger role in peacekeeping missions, see-
ing this as an important geopolitical contri-
bution of mutual benefit and an expression 
of fair transatlantic burden-sharing. Espe-
cially the battlegroups that have been fully 
operational since 2007 could be put to use 
in UN operations. 
Larger national contributions by EU 
members or more engagement by the Union 
are both conceivable. One advantage of the 
latter model is that the Union as a whole is 
free of any suspicion of pursuing national 
interests through participation in UN opera-
tions. The European Union also possesses 
complementary humanitarian instruments 
and civilian crisis management tools. 
Conclusion 
The ESS must fulfil three important re-
quirements. Firstly, it must take account of 
the changing policy frame, including Euro-
pean affairs more broadly as well as secu-
rity itself. Secondly it must formulate the 
European Union’s foreign and security 
policy ambitions more realistically and 
more modestly than to date. And as a con-
sequence, thirdly, it must place relations 
between the European Union and the Unit-
ed States on a new footing. That applies to 
the bilateral dimension, and even more so 
to shared ideas about the international 
order and relations to other actors in the 
international system. 
The planned reform of the ESS should 
clearly reflect the search for a better institu-
tional framework on which to build a trans-
atlantic security partnership. That would 
require a slimmer, more efficient decision-
making process for internal coordination 
within the Union. Function-specific mini-
lateralisms involving the Union or individ-
ual member states are the appropriate 
framework for transatlantic coordination 
of political strategies (Peter Rudolf). But 
such a bundling of transatlantic coopera-
tion is an ambitious endeavour. The EU 
member states would therefore be well-
advised to use the reform of the ESS to 
renew the transatlantic cooperation.  
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